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RECONCEPTUALIZING UNFUNDED MANDATES
AND OTHER REGULATIONS
Julie A. Roin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the childhood maxim of "I cut, you choose," we learn
the lesson that decisionmakers act more responsibly when forced to bear the
costs of the rules they enact. Much legal scholarship bears the imprint of
this lesson, but this scholarship also teaches us that the issue is more com-
plex than first appears. Different arguments for cost awareness or cost in-
ternalization arise in different contexts: it is variously argued that unfettered
decisionmakers underestimate the costs they impose, issue commands that
are selfish,1 engage in inefficient and unfair redistributions,2 or are simply
driven too much by the political benefits their directives generate. On the
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks are due to Saul Levmore, Elizabeth
Garrett, Dan Shaviro, David Bradford and participants in the University of Virginia Law School,
Northwestern University Law School, and University of Michigan Law School workshop programs and
NYU Law School's Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance for comments on earlier drafts of this
paper, as well as to Douglas Kern for his research assistance. All errors remain my own.
1 Contract law, for example, is often described as a system for creating incentives to prevent promi-
sors and promisees from acting opportunistically (selfishly). See; e.g., George M. Cohen, The Fault
Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1242 (1994) ("To reduce the costs associated with
opportunistic behavior, the optimal rules must discourage the promisor's opportunistic behavior by dis-
gorging the promisor's gains or otherwise punishing the promisor."); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1276 (1980)
("[U]nfettered individual behavior is incompatible with social optimization .... [T]he law can cause
individuals to consider external effects in their decisionmaking and thus 'internalize' them.").
2 This is the standard economic justification for the law of government takings. See, eg., RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 40-41 (1985); Wil-
liam A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the Military Draft for the
Takings Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 51 (1996); Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just
Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285,309-10 (1990).
3 Opponents of "unfunded mandates," a term defined presently, and other costly forms of govern-
mental regulation regularly make this claim. See, eg., NEWT GINGRICH, To RENEW AMERICA 229-33
(1995); U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REP. NO. M-193, Feder-
ally Induced Costs Affecting State and Local Governments (1994); Thomas Atwood, Home Rule: How
States Are Fighting Unfunded Federal Mandates, HERITAGE FOUND. ST. BACKGROUNDER No. 1011
(Dec. 28, 1994); Paul Gillmor & Fred Eames, Reconstruction of Federalism: A Constitutional Amend-
ment to Prohibit Unfunded Mandates, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 400 (1994); D. Bruce La Pierre, The
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other hand, it has been pointed out, requiring explicit compensation for the
costs of all rules may threaten the production of sensible rules when ex-
tracting payment for the benefits conferred by those rules is impractical.4
The presence of multiple decisionmakers produces additional difficulties.
Sometimes, we have to rely on the goodwill of the rulemakers, or on less-
than-concrete feedback mechanisms, to cause the rulemakers to care about
the welfare of those subject to their rules. We do not, for example, expect
governments to pay marginal victims or truckers when they raise or lower
speed limits on highways; parents are not encouraged to pay their children
when exercising disciplinary authority; employers do not pay when they is-
sue unpopular workplace rules; judges do not pay disappointed litigants. In
contrast, governments must occasionally pay when they intrude upon or
"take" private property, legislators sometimes live by the rules they draft,
and in the contrary examples just listed the rulemaker is thought to bear
some costs-especially if its rules prove unwise and unpopular. As with
most balancing acts, reasonable observers may disagree with the balance
struck between the various concerns in particular contexts.
This Article deals with one such controversial context: unfunded man-
dates. As used in this Article, the term "unfunded mandates" refers to di-
rectives emanating from one level of government to subordinate levels,
unaccompanied by the funds necessary to defray the costs of implementa-
tion.5 The obvious, and oft-stated, objection to such rulemaking is that un-
constrained or "free" rulemaking-in this case an apparent separation of
rulemaking power from the political costs inherent in raising the funds nec-
Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the
Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 1010 (1982); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 61 (1988); Edward A. Zelinsky, Un-
funded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and
Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1389 (1993); George F. Will, Leaning on the States, WASH.
POST, Apr. 7, 1994, at A17.
4 See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1355-56 (1991).
5 There are almost as many definitions as there are articles written on the subject of unfunded man-
dates. The diversity stems in part from the multifarious burdens superior levels of government place on
subordinate levels of government. See Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the
"New(New) Federalism:" Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv. 97, 104-11 (1996)
(describing history of definitional dispute). Some descriptions bifurcate these burdens into two catego-
ries: "compliance legislation," which ensures that state and local governments comply with federal re-
quirements in operation of the enterprises they own, such as landfills and sewage treatment plants, or the
services they provide, and "implementation legislation," which requires that state and local governments
act as enforcers of federal regulations applicable to private actors. See David A. Dana, The Case for
Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1995). A very modem reason for this
sort of bifurcation is that the viability of implementation legislation has been called into question by the
Supreme Court's decision in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997). The line between unfunded
mandates and conditions of assistance has also been the subject of some dispute, again because courts
tend to view conditions more favorably than mandates. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
167-68 (1992). But see D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process-
The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 594 (1985) (question-
ing distinction).
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essary to implement these rules-will lead to unwise or excessive direc-
tives. The bulk of the commentary about unfunded mandates follows this
tack,7 albeit without much linkage to the even more substantial literature on
government takings or other closely related matters.8 In turn, a small but
effective literature has emerged to make the case for unfunded mandates
using arguments equally familiar in other areas. For example, although
state and local governments may be burdened by uncompensated directives
from the federal government, these subordinate governments may join to-
gether and become effective players in the federal political process.9
Moreover, the obvious alternative of funded mandates raises serious prob-
lems familiar to students of moral hazard and other agency conflicts in a va-
6 Some critics describe this phenomenon as a form of fiscal illusion affecting both legislators and
voters. Because the costs of unfunded mandates are "off-budgee'; that is, off their budget, legislators
may fail to take them into account when evaluating the wisdom of programs, while voters, who should
be overseeing their legislative representatives, may fail to comprehend the source of the regulatory costs
they bear. See, eg., Gillmore & Eames, supra note 3, at 400 (mandates "foster a [Congressional] culture
of irresponsibility"); Zelinsky, supra note 3, at 1369-70 (mandates as a form of hidden taxation). Fiscal
illusion thus explains both legislative errors and legislative self-dealing. Of course, neither is possible if
the political process operates to properly monitor legislators. One of the questions faced in this Article
is the likelihood of such monitoring in the context of intergovernmental mandates.
7 This chorus of criticism has been sufficiently extensive to prompt the quip that "[unfunded man-
dates] now have achieved something akin to the status of Soviet Communism during the heyday of the
McCarthy era: Everybody is against them." Dana, supra note 5, at 1. Eliminating such mandates was
part of the conservative agenda set forth in the "Contract with America," see CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA, THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE
REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 229-33 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994), which was
deemed fulfilled by the passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109
Stat. 48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter UMRA]. See id. at 130.
The UMRA seeks to deter the passage of unfunded mandates in two ways. First, it provides that a leg-
islator may raise a "point of order" against any legislation that would impose an unfunded mandate; the
point of order must be waived by a majority vote before the legislation can proceed. See 2 U.S.C.A. §
658(d) (West Supp. 1996). Second, it requires the Congressional Budget Office to prepare cost esti-
mates for particular kinds of legislative regulatory activities. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 658b-658f. Whether
UMRA will have much of an impact has been the subject of dispute. Compare Elizabeth Garrett, En-
hancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1168 (1997) ("Virtually no one characterizes UMRA as the final word in the search
for new and stronger political safeguards for federalism .... Assessments range from 'positive, if mod-
est' to 'a hoax."') (footnotes omitted) and Steinzor, supra note 5, at 100 (expressing skepticism that
UMRA will do more than raise legislators' consciousness) with Susan E. Leckrone, Turning Back the
Clock" The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and Its Effective Repeal of Environmental Legisla-
tion, 71 IND. L.J. 1029, 1048 (1996) ("UMRA turns back the clock for environmental regulations, taking
this country back to a time when it lacked any national policy on the environment .... ").
8 On "intergovernmental takings," see generally Ralph W. Dau, Problems in Condemnation of
Property Devoted To Public Use, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1517 (1966); John M. Payne, Intergovernmental
Condemnation as a Problem in Public Finance, 61 TEX. L. REV. 949 (1983); Michael H. Schill, Inter-
governmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 829
(1989); Note, The Sovereign's Duty to Compensate for the Appropriation of.Public Property, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1967),
9 A point emphasized in Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique,
50 VAND. L. RE. 1137, 1249 (1997); Dana, supra note 5, at 21-25; Garrett, supra note 7, at 1120-27.
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riety of areas of law. ° Under a system of funded mandates, recipient gov-
ernments have an incentive to overspend federal funds and to lobby the
central government for unwise mandates. Funding may thus change the
identity of the exploiter-state and local governments may begin exploiting
the federal government-without reducing the overall amount of exploita-
tion.
This Article explores the uneasy case against and for unfunded man-
dates in light of the wider literature on cost internalization. Its strategy is to
compare unfunded mandates to alternative institutional arrangements,
ranging from full federal funding---"funded mandates"--to full privatiza-
tion of program costs-"unfunded regulation"--from three perspectives.
The first, the public choice perspective, reduces to a question of political
accountability or cost internalization by politicians. The second, the agency
perspective, asks whether and when unfunded mandates may encourage
more efficient behavior by the mandated (or regulated) party. The third and
final perspective, labeled the "fairness" perspective, looks at the distribution
of mandates' economic burdens among individuals. In particular, it ex-
plores the extent to which the tax system operates to redistribute that burden
among taxpayers generally. One of the questions examined in each per-
spective is the extent to which subordinate governments are and are not dif-
ferent from other "victims" of the regulatory state, such as business
enterprises and individuals. I reach the tentative conclusion that if there is a
case for special sympathy for subordinate governments, which would jus-
tify special limitations on unfunded mandates, it is not one based on politi-
cal process or agency cost considerations but rather on the grounds of
fairness. In short, current attacks on unfunded mandates are misdirected.
In essence, this Article looks at unfunded mandates as its critics do-as
a financing device. However, where its critics see only deceit and political
gimmickry, this Article points out the positive attributes of such man-
dates-the same positive attributes that have made unfunded regulations of
other sorts a staple of governmental control. Mandates share the advantages
of such regulations. They also share the disadvantages of such regulations;
mandates, like regulation, are no panacea. The final part of the Article tries
to identify situations in which the advantages of mandates outweigh the dis-
10 See Dana, supra note 5, at 36-37; KATHLEEN SEGERSON ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL
TRANSFERS IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNFUNDED MANDATES (Law and
Economic Publication Series, Center for Real Estate and Urban Economic Studies, University of Con-
necticut, 1995). For a more extended treatment of these issues, see infra notes 113-116 and accompa-
nying text.
There is of course the alternative of no mandates at all, but for the most part the discussion here as-
sumes the case for federal regulation, whether because of externalities, public choice considerations,
gains from uniformity, or a number of other familiar possibilities. Critics of unfunded mandates often
assume the opposite, and part of their claim is that unjustifiable regulations would disappear if federal
funding were required.
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advantages, as well as suggesting ways in which those disadvantages may
be ameliorated.
The Article concentrates on pragmatic issues. It avoids direct discus-
sion, for example, of the many constitutional issues raised by the federal
government's use of unfunded mandates directed at states and localities.
Such issues are discussed elsewhere by others more attuned to constitu-
tional subtleties1 than I am.
II. UNFUNDED DmcrivEs OF THE COMMON KIND
Subordinate governments are but one target of unfunded government
directives and legislatures are but one source of such directives. All levels
of government frequently require business enterprises and individuals to
expend their own money--or fail to collect potential profits-to do certain
things or not do certain things. Almost without exception, the government
could indemnify the affected private parties, if not carry out the desired ac-
tivity itself. By looking at situations in which the government has not cho-
sen either of those alternatives, this Article attempts to identify the
considerations at stake in such decisions. It then uses these considerations
as a basis for reevaluating the desirability of unfunded mandates to subordi-
nate levels of government.
A. Governmental Regulation of Employers and Businesses
A number of governmentally imposed restrictions hedge employment
relationships. Some impose rules or responsibilities regarding the employ-
ment relationship itself, while others relate to other aspects of running a
business; virtually all these directives require the employer to spend more
money than it would spend in the absence of the regulation. The discussion
in this Part focuses on the minimum wage, "reasonable accommodations"
under the Americans With Disabilities Act, and environmental directives.
While not randomly selected, these schemes exemplify the sorts of burdens
the government imposes on employers.'2 In any event, I hope to show that
the seemingly disparate, if modest, examples of "unfunded" regulations I
have chosen contain elements that illuminate questions about unfunded
mandates in both the private and public contexts. In large part, the com-
parison will suggest that familiar criticisms leveled at intergovernmental
11 See, eg., Adler, supra note 9, at 1193-1219; Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordi-
nacy: May Congress Commandeer States to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes
Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn 't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813 (1998).
12 Many other examples of federal "unfunded" rulemaking exist. The federal income tax, immigra-
tion law, Federal Reserve policy, defense expenditures, retirement policies, and our evolving conception
of federalism probably affect most firms far more than the illustrative, modest regulatory schemes ex-
plored in this Article. But some features of our mixed economy must be taken as given or any analytic
enterprise quickly spins out of control with a kind of circularity.
93:351 (1999)
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unfunded mandates are misplaced or serve as merely rhetorical devices to
draw attention to the regulatory state quite generally.
1. Minimum Wage Regulation.-Minimum wage legislation is in many
ways the archetypal unfunded directive. It requires employers to pay some
employees more than their market wage or to refrain from hiring these oth-
erwise desired employees. The goals of minimum wage legislation might
presumably have been effected through other strategies that did not target
employers. Instead of regulating employers in an uncompensated manner,
the law might have provided for direct payments to individuals, employed
or otherwise, in amounts determined by reference to the difference between
their wages and a legally defined "living wage. ' 3 But it does not; one critic
of minimum wage legislation describes the result as "a wage subsidy to
low-wage employees, financed by a tax on low-wage employers."' 4
This first example of unfunded regulation-assuming, as I will con-
tinue to do, that -funding has not been provided through logrolling with
other legislation providing offsetting benefits to the affected employers or
customers-illustrates the point that unfunded regulations may be as con-
troversial as unfunded mandates; the minimum wage has no lack of crit-
ics.' Most economists object to minimum wage legislation much as they
13 Alternatively, it could just establish a negative income tax program, an idea that has generated re-
newed interest. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal
Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 474-75 (1997).
14 Id. at 407. In fact, it is uncertain who bears the cost of the minimum wage. Although in the first
instance, the cost falls on employers, employers undoubtedly attempt to shift its burden elsewhere. For
example, employers may seek to pass the costs on to customers in the form of price increases. The suc-
cess of such a strategy depends in large part on whether they compete against other enterprises exempt
from such wage constraints. As most minimum wage employees are in the retail trade sector in which
jobs are location-specific, see DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE
NEW ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 315 (1995), competition from unregulated foreign employers
seems relatively unlikely. On the other hand, demand tends to fall as prices rise, because potential con-
sumers choose to make different expenditures. Careful incidence analysis thus requires some investiga-
tion of the degree to which higher prices reduce demand and, in an imperfectly competitive market,
employer profits.
Is Indeed, an important undercurrent here is that objections to unfunded mandates may amount to
rhetorical strategies for objecting to the substance of various governmental decisions. Under this view,
the objections to these legislative directives would take different form if federal funding were forth-
coming, but the objections would continue. The point about the rhetoric, or adversarial nature of the
criticisms, echoes what others have already noted. See Dana, supra note 5, at 3; Makram B. Jaber, Un-
funded Federal Mandates: An Issue of Federalism or a 'Brilliant Sound Bite'?, 45 EMoRY L.J. 281, 294
(1996). For examples of the adversarial approach, see Atwood, supra note 3; Gillmor & Eames, supra
note 3, at 395-96; Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental
Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2394 (1996) (defending environmental mandates as a special case); Leck-
rone, supra note 7, at 1047-48 (same); Sheriffs Versus the Brady Law, NEW AM., Aug. 22, 1994, at 15
(sheriffs admit they filed 10th Amendment challenge to Brady bill because of their opposition to all gun
control).
356
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do to rent control and to other well-intentioned barriers to free markets.1 6
Nevertheless, minimum wage legislation is politically popular and, indeed,
Congress has recently revisited and renewed this regulatory scheme.1 7
a. Public Choice Issues.-It is interesting that public choice the-
ory has played so small a role in the campaign against minimum-wage leg-
islation because a substantial case can be made for the proposition that this
particular unfunded regulation owes its survival to the political disadvan-
tages of two important groups. These groups are potential workers who be-
come or remain unemployed as a result of the legislated wage, 8 and
consumers who pay higher prices for goods produced or distributed in in-
dustries affected by minimum-wage regulation.
The potential workers affected by the minimum wage constitute a clas-
sic example of a dispersed, unidentifiable, powerless interest.1 9 The diffi-
culties inherent in identifying individuals ag oieved by discriminatory
hiring practices have been discussed elsewhere; 0 individuals adversely af-
fected by the minimum wage are even less likely to be identifiable or to
self-identify correctly. A large subset of both groups has by hypothesis
failed to secure employment, so that the workplace does not offer an op-
portunity for identification and political organization.2' Many workers who
benefit from minimum wage legislation will, no doubt, also find it difficult
to identify and organize in support of extensions of minimum wage legisla-
tion, but, as union experiences seem to demonstrate, the losers are in the
more difficult position. Political organization and opposition to minimum
wage regulation seem seriously underpowered because of this problem of
self-identification. It is therefore unnecessary to add that, even if this
problem of self-identification could be overcome, these individuals likely
lack both the finances and proclivity to political action necessary to com-
pete with opposing, organized groups.
16 Economists regard the minimum wage as generating the same effect as an employee cartel. It
raises the price of labor and (perhaps) increases total income among low-wage workers as a group, but at
the cost of destroying some low-wage jobs and thereby increasing unemployment. See CARD &
KRUEGER, supra note 14, at 1; Shaviro, supra note 13, at 406.
17 A Republican-controlled Congress voted for a 90 cent increase in the minimum wage (from $4.25
to $5.15) in 1996. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 2104, 110
Stat. 1755, 1928 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206).
18 Unemployment results both because workers become expensive relative to capital, so at the mar-
gin, employers invest in labor-saving equipment and because of shrinkage of the sector of the economy
affected by the wage increase. See supra note 14 (demand falls as prices rise). In the latter case, an-
other segment of the economy will expand as consumers decide to spend their money elsewhere, but the
new jobs may not go to workers and potential workers displaced by the minimum wage.
19 I will leave alone the question ofjudicial intervention on behalf of such underrepresented groups.
20 See George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REv. 117, 135 (1995)
(discussing the identity ofsuch groups for the purposes of litigation in a class action suit).
21 Indeed, they may not even have applied for jobs, because the minimum wage may have discour-
aged employers from offering such jobs in the first place.
93:351 (1999)
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Consumers suffer from similar, though perhaps less severe, disadvan-
tages. Here the problem is less identification as a member of a group than
identification of the magnitude of the cost imposed on them by proposed or
actual regulation. Without information about the cost one bears, it is diffi-
cult to know how much to invest--even if collective action problems could
be overcome-in an attempt to block the imposition of these costs.
There are, to be sure, public-choice-style responses to the puzzling fact
that the unfunded character of mandates draws so much criticism fueled by
political accountability considerations while the unfunded character of
minimum wage legislation draws so little-even though some of the "los-
ers" in the latter context seem significantly worse off than the "losers" in
the intergovernmental mandate setting. Perhaps price increases resulting
from minimum wages create less excitement than tax increases arising from
mandates.2 2 Another possible response draws on the public choice literature
about concentrated and dispersed benefits and costs. Minimum-wage
regulation and intergovernmental mandates both impose dispersed costs, the
argument might run, but minimum wage legislation is relatively more suc-
cessful because the benefits it brings are more concentrated than those cre-
ated by most mandates.2
The most interesting explanation of the disparate reactions to these two
kinds of unfunded legislation draws attention to yet another aspect of un-
funded mandates. In the case of minimum wage regulation, the political
strength of employers may remedy the weakness of affected consumers and
potential workers. Many of these employers appear able to overcome col-
lective action problems in the political arena by virtue of their sheer size24
or membership in historically effective trade associations of like-minded
firns. 5 Indeed, something of a public choice case can be made for prefer-
2 People may be more accustomed to, and less offended by, what they perceive as "inflation" than
by tax increases, which they often ascribe to government inefficiency, if not corruption.
At the very least, a subset of minimum-wage workers know that they received wage increases at
the time the statutory requirement took effect. In contrast, few beneficiaries of, for example, environ-
mental regulation are cognizant of their gains. They would be unlikely to think that, in the absence of
regulation, they would with some probability have developed asthma from constant exposure to what
would have been the ambient level of air pollution.
24 Large retailers and fast food franchisers come to mind. See CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 14, at
315 (64% of minimum wage workers employed by multi-establishment firms); Shavira, supra note 13,
at 419.
25 Although many of those testifying against recent increases in the minimum wage represented
only the interests of their own small businesses, the witnesses included representatives of trade associa-
tions such as the National Restaurant Association, the National Association of Convenience Stores, and
the National Retail Federation. See 142 CONG. REC. S7346 (daily ed. July 8, 1996) (National Retail
Federation Memorandum); Prepared Statement of Duncan Thomas on Behalf of the National Associa-
tion of Convenience Stores Before the House Committee on Small Business, FED. NEWS SERVICE, May
15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File; Prepared Statement of Herman Cain On Be-
half of the National Restaurant Association Before the Joint Economic Committee, FED. NEWS SERVICE,
February 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File.
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ring the unfunded minimum wage over the alternative of government subsi-
dies to low-paid workers or especially to firms that hire such marginal
workers.
The argument is a variation of Gordon Tullock's intriguing idea aimed
at curbing excessive government spending. Tullock was among the first to
observe that well-organized coalitions push for spending programs at the
expense of dispersed taxpayers.26 He suggested that a healthier political
balance might be struck by a system that, in a kind of second-best fashion,
thoughtfully matched combatants; proposals for new spending programs
might be required to specify their funding sources and the "losers" ought to
be fairly matched in organizational terms with the beneficiaries.2 7 Creating
competition among interest groups might, in turn, actually lead to some
consideration of the substantive merits of proposed programs, thereby pro-
moting efficient government.28 In the case of minimum-wage legislation,
employers might constitute well-matched opponents for unions that favor
minimum wage regulation. These employers do not bear the entire cost of
the regulation, nor do the proponents of minimum-wage regulation enjoy all
the benefits, inasmuch as many of the beneficiaries are themselves unlikely
to self-identify. At the least, the employers provide some counterweight to
what might otherwise be an unopposed, special interest group arguing in
favor of minimum-wage legislation.
Armed with this surprisingly cheery public choice view of minimum
wage legislation, an optimist might advance the view that with organized
interests in fair combat, the survival of minimum-wage legislation can be
ascribed to the persuasiveness of the proponents' arguments addressed to
26 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 292-94 (1962);
Gordon Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J. POL. ECON. 571 (1959).
27 Tullock credits Buchanan for this suggestion. See Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking and Tax Re-
form, 6 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 37, 46 (1998) ("Many years ago, James Buchanan suggested a solu-
tion: The U.S. could select-perhaps at random--some other group of people about the same size as the
benefited group and could put the tax on them. Thus, two lobbying groups would be opposing each
other and the outcome presumably would be improved.").
28 If we take the Tullock-Buchanan proposal seriously, then one practical problem is that the artifi-
cially burdened interest group may invest in passing the burden to others rather than in arguing against
the merits of the substantive spending or other program. This sort of degeneration might be avoided if
there is an independent rationale for choosing the cost-bearing group.
29 One way to think about this is to realize that the special interest group in favor of minimum-wage
legislation is a given. Its existence does not depend on the choice of the financing mechanism as long as
labor bears less than 100% of the cost of the proposal. The question, then, is under what circumstances
effective political opposition to such proposals is most likely to develop. If the government chose to
fund an income support program with its general revenues, tax conscious voters might come together to
oppose the legislation or the legislators opposing such legislation. These voters, however, may also be
too dispersed, and each individual's burden too minor, for anyone to shoulder the requisite organiza-
tional burden. A smaller number of more severely impacted voters (businesses) might in fact provide
more potent political opposition to the program. This is an exemplar of the central mystery of public
choice theory: sometimes, large numbers generate political power while at other times large numbers
result in political weakness.
93:351 (1999)
HeinOnline  -- 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 359 1998-1999
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
legislators or to the voting public, who apparently serve as the arbiters of
clashes between interest groups. I turn now to these arguments, with an eye
on the larger claim about unfunded mandates and unfunded regulations.
b. Agency Costs and Alternative Means.--Opponents of the
minimum wage often point out the absence of a requirement that a wage
floor be effected through constraints on employer pay scales. They argue
that it would be better to let the market dictate wages and to have the gov-
ernment make direct payments to poor workers equal to the difference be-
tween their market wage and whatever minimum or "living wage"
politicians sought to provide.30 Closer inspection reveals, however, the ad-
vantages of regulating through employers rather than funding through gov-
ernments.3
It is nearly axiomatic that many people tend to be less careful when
spending other people's money. This tendency is especially true when an
expenditure benefits the decisionmaker. In such cases, overspending has
little downside and a definite upside. As a result, the establishment of a
system for monitoring expenditures becomes an integral part of the process
of delegating spending decisions. Sometimes agents can easily be pre-
vented from engaging in corrupt or wasteful practices; on other occasions,
however, controlling such misbehavior can be extremely difficult. One
would expect to see fewer delegations of spending authority when moni-
toring is difficult than when it is easy precisely because such situations pro-
vide too much room for inefficiency or corruption.
One can see just such monitoring difficulties in the minimum wage
situation. If governments paid the difference between market and minimum
wages, employers might be expected to underpay workers, knowing that
their default will be corrected with government funds.32  Indeed, side-
30 See Shaviro, supra note 13. One can argue that the Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC") comes
close to this approach for low-wage workers. Though originally designed to return federal employment
taxes paid by low-income workers, it now provides certain low-income taxpayers with an income sup-
plement correlated to the amount of earned income. As long as the taxpayer's household income re-
mains below a statutory maximum, the amount of the credit increases with the taxpayer's earned
income. If the sole breadwinner of a family of three works at the minimum wage for fifty 40-hour
weeks during 1997 (thereby earning $10,300), his or her EITC would be 40% of $8,890 ($3,556) effec-
tively raising the gross wage from $5.15 to $6.93 per hour. See I.RLC. § 32(b)(1)(A), (b)(2) (West Supp.
1998). A negative income tax would do much the same, but it would also assist nonworkers. See
Shaviro, supra note 13, at 474-75. The EITC does not necessarily provide the difference between a low
actual wage and a living wage, calculated on an hourly basis, because its amount ultimately depends on
household income rather than the worker's hourly wage. Thus, a taxpayer who works very few hours at
a relatively high wage-well above minimum wage, and perhaps even an above-average wage-may
also qualify for the EITC.
31 Again, employers may pass on these costs to consumers or, as I suggest presently, to other tax-
payers. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
32 If, for example, the minimum wage were $6.00 per hour, an employer prepared to offer $5.50 or
$6.00 might instead offer $5.00, secure in the knowledge that employees could accept this wage and
obtain the balance from government.
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payments from employers to workers may leave all parties to the employ-
ment contract better off. Alternatively, employers may put phantom work-
ers on their payrolls, enabling friends, relatives, or others who are willing to
pay for this privilege to collect an unintended government subsidy. The
federal government would have a difficult time differentiating between le-
gitimate and illegitimate employment arrangements, because to do so would
require fairly extensive knowledge of the operation of the employer's enter-
prise as well as general industry practices. Indeed, the employer-financing
mechanism of the minimum-wage laws may well provide a monitoring
function that makes more transparent government wage subsidies such as
the EITC workable.33 In any event, it is apparent that unfunded government
regulation may be far superior to funded regulation or direct subsidies.
c. "Fairness ".--One of the criticisms leveled at unfunded regu-
lations concerns the apparent and unfair "singling out" of individuals or
small groups. These "losers" sometimes bear the costs associated with pro-
grams that benefit the general public. This is, of course, the paradigmatic
character of what we call compensable governmental takings of private
property. Public benefits should be paid for by the public, rather than
through an involuntary extraction from a few unlucky individuals.
In the short run minimum wage context, employers of minimum-wage
employ'ees appear to be "losers." They seem to bear a disproportionate
share3 of the financial burden of the costs of this social program. Over the
longer term, though, as prices adjust to take into account the burden of the
wage increase, the incidence of the wage hike shifts (at least in part) to con-
sumers and to unidentifiable, potential workers. Initial unfairness segues
into inefficiency,35 which some may find less objectionable. But another
reason exists to reassess the conventional view of the ideological battle over
minimum wage legislation, and this subtle ingredient may prove to be an
important distinguishing feature with respect to unfunded mandates and
33 Indeed, persistent complaints about fraud and abuse in the administration of the EITC surface in
the one situation in which such employer monitoring does not exist, namely self-employment income.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTrNG OFFICE, TAX GAP, GAO/GGD-#94-123, 15 (1994) (acknowledging impos-
sibility of. adequate auditing of self-employment income); Gene Steurle, The IRS Cannot Control the
New Superterranean Economy, 59 TAx NOTES 1839 (1993) (detailing abuses of EITC by misreporting
of self-employment income); George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working
Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 225, 259
(1994) (ineligible families had higher percentage of self-employment income and lower wages than av-
erage recipient).
34 It is disproportionate, at least, either to their responsibility for creating the problem Qow-skill
employees), or to our conception of "ability to pay," because their contribution is not correlated with
their income.
35 See Boris Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out In-
equities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 746 (1979). Professor Bittker enumerates some of the
circumstances in which inequities would remain. See id. at 746-48. Moreover, the inefficiencies may
have an inequitable component in redirecting investment or employment opportunities from politically
or economically disadvantaged groups.
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regulations quite generally. Employers may pay higher wages because of
minimum-wage regulation, they may pay more for substitute nonlabor in-
puts, and they may fail to recoup some of these costs through higher prod-
uct prices, but they do secure some offsetting benefit through the federal
income tax. All income-tax paying employers may deduct labor costs as a
business expense. The value of the deduction depends, of course, on the
taxpayer's marginal tax rate. Each additional dollar of deductions reduces a
taxpayer's tax bill by a dollar times the taxpayer's tax rate. The tax "saved"
as a result of the deduction can be seen as the government's "co-payment
' 36
with respect to the employer's minimum-wage bill.37
Another way of looking at this phenomenon of sharing the costs of
regulation through the tax system builds on the fact that an employer retains
after-tax profits. The cost of the minimum wage to an employer is thus
measured by the difference between what its after-tax profits would have
been had there been no minimum-wage legislation and its actual after-tax
profits. The federal government pays the remaining addition to the em-
ployer's wage bill in the form of foregone tax revenues. This particular
regulation can in this way be understood as partially funded.38
There are, to be sure, employers, including nonprofit and unprofitable
enterprises as well as governmental organizations, who pay little or no fed-
eral income taxes. The burden of the minimum wage thus falls on employ-
ers, and in the longer run, their customers and potential employees,
unequally. This is true even if, as seems unlikely, all employers have com-
parable ability to pass on costs in the form of higher prices. But it seems
fair to insist that through the deductibility of higher wage costs, as well as
the costs of substitute inputs, in the short run the overall burden of the
minimum wage falls on the tax-paying public in a way that has not been
recognized.3 9 This short-run redistribution may, in turn, decrease the long-
36 Many tax purists take umbrage at labeling a tax decrease a governmental "copayment," preferring
instead to describe the phenomenon as a reduction in the taxpayer's net cost of compliance with the re-
striction. This distinction is important in some contexts-for example, when trying to determine
whether a particular tax provision rises to the level of "state action"--but in the absence of such a con-
cern here, this Article uses the copayment language because it more vividly conveys the economic rela-
tionship between the taxpayer, the government, and the expenditures than does "net cost reduction."
37 The employer's share of the minimum-wage burden is the additional salary amount multiplied by
one minus the employer's marginal tax rate. If, for example, the employer's wage bill increases by
$50,000 as a result of the minimum-wage rules, and its marginal tax rate is 38%, the government "pays"
$19,000 through a reduction in its tax revenues and the employer pays $31,000 in the form of reduced
after-tax profit. The government's copayment decreases along with the employer's marginal tax rate.
The deduction for business expenses reduces the net cost of all business expenditures; wage expenses
are in no sense special in this regard. Thus, this tax treatment serves only to reduce the financial burden
borne by employers as a result of the minimum wage; it does not provide employers with an incentive to
expend money on wages as opposed to more capital-intensive labor substitutes.
38 The extent to which this copayment leaves the government worse off depends upon the relative
tax rates of the employer and employee, because employees must include their wages in taxable income.
39 The cost-spreading implications of such tax treatment seem to have gone unnoticed. Similarly,
the government does not draw attention to its "copayments.' As the discussion in the text emphasizes,
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term inefficiencies created as affected parties readjust their activities and
transactions to take the new labor costs into account.
Although my analysis of unfunded regulations needs to expand and un-
fold before returning to unfunded mandates, the careful reader will see the
beginning of a punchline. Minimum-wage regulation is financed in part by
the federal government in a way that unfunded intergovernmental mandates
are not. Mandates might therefore be more objectionable. But I will not
rush the reader to this conclusion. My point in sketching what lies ahead is
to give some definition to the "fairness" label. An assessment of the fair-
ness of a regulatory scheme refers, at least here, to the redistribution of
wealth effected by that scheme, with an eye on the baseline drawn by the
preexisting tax scheme and regulatory structure. In the absence of detailed
incidence analysis, regulated parties are assumed to be better off when a
substantial portion of the cost of regulations affecting them is borne by tax-
payers quite generally. Unfunded regulations are regarded as "fairer" when
innocent40 losers are in part rescued by the taxpayers. This somewhat arbi-
trary terminology aims, of course, to emphasize the wedge that might grow
between unfunded regulations and unfunded mandates. Further sketching
is, however, deferred to Part III below.
2. The Americans With Disabilities Act.-It is useful to repeat the ex-
ercise just concluded with a new, rather than seasoned, example of un-
funded regulation of employers; the obligations imposed by the Americans
With Disabilities Act ("ADA") 41 offer suitable grist. The ADA imposes
numerous responsibilities on public and private entities "to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. 42 The ADA regulates physical struc-
tures as well as labor markets. Thus, owners of "public accommodations
and commercial facilities" must ensure that the disabled have access to an
new and remodeled spaces43 and employers must offer any "qualified'
the obscurity of these copayments may serve to increase the political pressure against regulation and
may prevent more aggressive rent-seeking by groups seeking subsidies. On the other hand, if the true
cost to the government could be calculated, it might form the foundation of better government decision-
making. However, this cost calculation would be complex because it would have to integrate the tax
burden of recipients of attributable wage increases. See supra note 38.
40 The analysis differs, of course, when the "losers" are not "innocent" but are instead being called
upon to rectify harms that their actions have created. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
4' 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12122B (1994).
42 Id. § 12101(b).
43 Id. § 12183.
44 A disabled person is a "qualified individual with a disability" if she is "an individual with a dis-
ability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em-
ployment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8). Under the ADA, an employer
will be deemed to have discriminated against, and be liable for damages to, a "qualified individual" if it
fails to make available to that individual "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
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disabled persons the same employment opportunities as those offered to
nondisabled persons. Employers must structure their selection processes to
enable a "qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the posi-
tion such qualified applicant desires;' '4S they must provide and pay for "rea-
sonable accommodation[s]" required by "qualified individuas] with a
disability" to "perform the essential functions of that position; '  and em-
ployers must enable such employees "to enjoy equal benefits and privileges
of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees
without disabilities. 47
a. Public Choice Issues.-As with minimum-wage legislation, the
puzzle is that for all the controversy about this legislation, in particular its
basic premise and administrative complexity, arguments pointing to the
likely imbalance in the political process have been given far less credence
when made against the employer portions of the ADA48 than when made
with respect to unfunded intergovernmental mandates, including those por-
tions of the ADA that apply only to subordinate 'governments.49  Once
again, employers may be a relatively powerful group,50 but it would appear
that state and local governments are comparably capable of political bat-
tle.5 '
b. Agency Costs and Alternative Means.-Framing the matter in
terms of unfunded mandates, rather than in terms of the structural alterna-
tives, distracts us once again from the problems that would be encountered
in a system in which the rulemaker attached money to its commands. Sen-
sible expenditures are situation-specific, and it will normally be difficult for
an outsider to monitor spending decisions. In the case of employee ac-
commodations, for instance, accommodations should reflect the operation
of a particular workplace, an individual's role in that workplace, and the
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee.
Id. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12117.
45 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(o)(1)(i) (1997).
46 Id. § 1630.2(o).
41 id. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii).
48 Title I of the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117) applies to employers generally, and Title Ill (42
U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189) applies to "public accommodations and services operated by private entities."
49 Title II of the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165) provides antidiscrimination rules for services
provided by a "public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
50 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 101-112 and accompanying text. Many of the arguments that have been advanced
to discount the political strength of states and localities, such as fear of retaliation on other issues and
disparities of interest within the likely political collective, apply equally to businesses. Some are less
affected by the minimum wage and other regulations than others, so there is conflict within trade asso-
ciations, for example, and most receive federal benefits under various programs so that they might have
as much to fear in terms of political retaliation.
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extent and type of each individual employee's disability. 2 An outsider may
be able to judge whether an employer's accommodations allow an em-
ployee to fulfill the essential functions of a job so that the employee enjoys
"equal benefits and privileges of employment, 5 3 but the outsider would be
unable to determine whether the employer had achieved those aims in a
cost-effective manner. Employers who were paid by the government to
take these steps might often make wasteful expenditures that they would
never incur with their own money even when required to meet the same
ends. Opportunities for corrupt arrangements would abound. Finally, a
system of substantial penalties for misspent government funds might simply
chill the very investments anticipated by the ADA. The agency cost per-
spective, in which the government is viewed as delegating to employers the
task of improving the workplace accommodation of disabled citizens, sug-
gests that unfunded mandates might well be far superior to a "payments-for-
services" scheme. And inasmuch as employers are perhaps the parties best
informed and best situated to effect these accommodations, we are driven to
the somewhat surprising conclusion that unfunded regulation may con-
ceivably be the best of all possible worlds. Regulated employers will have
selfish reasons to proceed efficiently, while funded programs, whether op-
tional or required, might be expected to produce grave waste.
Unfunded regulation may be better than the alternatives, but it is not
without problems even when viewed from an agency cost perspective. Un-
funded directives aimed at employers encourage employers to find reasons
not to hire employees who will prove expensive. Antidiscrimination rules
aim to prevent this escape, of course, but enforcement remains imperfect
and expensive.54 This might suggest that unfunded regulation makes most
sense in situations in which both the sufficiency of outcomes-in this case,
the sufficiency of accommodations-and inputs, or coverage-in this case,
the individuals in need of protection-can easily be monitored, while gov-
ernment funding should be provided or seriously considered in situations in
52 See Hilary Greer Fike, Learning Disabilities in the Workplace: A Guide to Americans with Dis-
abilities Act Compliance, 20 SEArLE U. L. REV. 489, 502 (1997) ('IT]he ADA requires employers to
conduct an individualized assessment of the employee's limitations vis-a-vis the job functions."); Law-
rence P. Postol & David D. Kadue, An Employer's Guide to the ADA: From Job Qualifications to Rea-
sonable Accommodations, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 693, 709 (1991) (emphasizing the need for a case-
by-case approach).
53 The sufficiency of proffered accommodations is perhaps the foremost issue in litigation brought
under the ADA. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Methodist Hosp. of Indiana, Inc., 89 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 1996);
Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107 (7th Cir. 1996); McCoy v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.,
933 F. Supp. 438 (M.D. Pa. 1996). See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112 n.11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997)
(collecting cases).
54 See Rutherglen, supra note 20, at 135 (noting that claims of intentional discrimination "continue
to protect workers who already have jobs, but they offer little continuing protection to workers who can-
not get jobs"). See generally John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature ofEmploy-
ment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1032-33 (1991) (speculating on reasons for
decrease in failure to hire cases).
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which monitoring the sufficiency of outcomes or inputs presents difficul-
ties. But this would be an oversimplification; the real trade-offs are more
complicated.
Governmental funding cannot rectify deficiencies in the ability to
measure outcomes. Indeed, providing governmental funding in situations in
which the sufficiency of outcomes cannot be evaluated is a recipe for waste
and corruption, because there could be no standard against which the em-
ployer's use of government funds could be measured. That is, it makes lit-
tle sense to reimburse employers for the expenses of accommodating
disabled employees when the efficacy of those accommodations cannot be
monitored. Instead, the proper response in such situations may be the
avoidance of regulation altogether.
55
By contrast, government funding may help prevent "underprovision
' 56
that takes the form of employer avoidance of disabled employees. Certainly
an open-ended governmental program for the reimbursement of employer
costs would eliminate much of the economic justification for disfavoring
disabled job applicants. However, as discussed above, it does so only at the
expense of creating significant opportunities for waste and fraud. Other
funding mechanisms may be more promising. For example, the govern-
ment might provide employers with a standard reimbursement amount tied
to the number of disabled employees and the extent of their disabilities.
57
Of course, the difficulty of determining an appropriate reimbursement
amount due to differences among employment situations provides one of
the justifications for relying on unfunded mandates to begin with. Once one
assumes an inability to determine the correct reimbursement rate, a trade-
55 Focusing on the methods of accommodation, rather than their outcomes, does not provide a way
out of this quandary. Although the government can always monitor the existence or not of specifically
identified accommodations, it would be bizarre and wasteful to specifically identify and require particu-
lar accommodations that cannot be validated as improving individuals' job performance. Nor would it
make sense to try to hold employers to a standard that the government can neither identify nor measure
compliance with. At best, such standards would become mere political window dressing; at worst, they
would fuel endless, expensive litigation between employers, the government, and ostensibly benefited
employees.
56 I use this term for lack of a better alternative. This underprovision can take several forms. In ad-
dition to the example provided in the text-the failure to hire an ostensibly-protected employee-
underprovision may result from an employer's decision to avoid hiring anyone by failing to expand (or
start) its business. The prevalence of such "activity level effects" are a staple of law-and-economics
analysis. See Hills, supra note 11, at 894 & n. 269.
57 The government could create a schedule similar to those that it has developed for purposes of
workmen's compensation or disability payments, estimating the cost of accommodating particular dis-
abilities. Employers whose expenses exceeded the scheduled amounts would suffer from their profli-
gacy, while others could profit by providing more cost-effective accommodation.
Note that providing reimbursements on a less tailored basis-say, providing an amount based on av-
erage costs or average number of disabled employees--risks reintroducing the incentive to discriminate
against disabled employees, or some subcategories thereof.
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off, or balancing act, ensues-additional protection for new hires versus the
likelihood of wasteful expenditures on unnecessary accommodations. 8
Employers are not the only source of wasteful expenditures. Employ-
ees may also ask for unreasonably expensive accommodations. It is note-
worthy in this regard that the ADA's directives are not all categorical.
While all new buildings must provide handicap access, 9 employers need
not make accommodations in cases in which such accommodations would
impose an "undue hardship. 60 The definition of "hardship" does not de-
pend solely on the cost of the accommodation. Congress specifically re-
jected an amendment that would have provided that employers need not
provide an accommodation bearing a cost exceeding ten percent of the em-
ployee's or potential employee's annual salary, as well as another that
would have limited total accommodation expenses to five percent of the
employer's "annual net profit.' 61  Instead, the regulations, consistent with
congressional intent, provide that what constitutes an "undue hardship" be
determined in light of the financial resources of the employer's enterprise.62
58 Or, perhaps more likely, the employer usurpation of excess funds in the event of overly generous
reimbursement amounts or the continuation of employer discrimination in the event of insufficient reim-
bursement amounts. Congress's decision in this instance to rely on unfunded regulation can be ex-
plained through a public choice lens: one might argue that this particular choice was preordained by the
inability of the not-hired, or potential nonhires, to organize effectively. One might counter this analysis,
though, by arguing that there were no obvious opponents to federally funded accommodations for dis-
abled employees; employers surely preferred that the federal government fund their accommodation re-
sponsi'bilities.
59 The sole exception is for situations "where an entity can demonstrate that it is structurally im-
practicable to meet the requirements of such subsection... " 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (1994). Entities
remodeling buildings are required "to make alterations in such a manner that, to the maximum extent
feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with dis-
abilities ... where such alterations.., are not disproportionate to the overall alterations in terms of cost
and scope." Id. § 12183(a)(2). "Structural impracticability" has been defined to include "only... those
rare circumstances when the unique characteristics of terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility
features." 36 C.F.I. Ch. XI, pt. 1191, App. A § 4.1.1(5)(a) (1997). No definitions for the terms "maxi-
mum extent feasible" or "disproportionate" have been issued.
60 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). This hardship excuse does not apply to other employer obligations,
such as the obligation to "select and administer tests concerning employment... to ensure that, when
such [a] test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability... that such test results
accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor... that such [a] test purports to measure,"
id. § 12113(b)(7), or to avoid using
qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability.., unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as
used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent
with business necessity.
Id. § 12112(b)(6).
61 Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When An Employer's Financial
Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391,426-27
(1995).
62 The pertinent regulation reads, in part:
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered
entity, factors to be considered include:
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One employer's reasonable accommodation may in this way be another's
undue hardship. It follows that an employee's rights, and residual burden,
are as much a function of the characteristics of his or her employer as of his
or her own special needs.
I will have something else to say in the next Part about this difference
between the ADA and most regulations directed at the employment rela-
tionship. But agency considerations may provide a partial explanation. The
escape valve available to the employer in the form of the undue hardship
exception may encourage some employees to moderate their demands, or to
invest their own funds alongside their employer's in what might be seen as
an efficient joint venture,63 or face the possibility of no accommodation at
all.64
c. Fairness Again.-It is plausible that the minimum wage affects
competing employers equally but that the employee-accommodation rules
found in the ADA do not, if only because the smaller numbers of these ex-
pensive employees make sporadic and randomly distributed realities more
relevant than averages. From a public choice perspective it is noteworthy
that the collective action problem among employers might be yet greater
because these employers will find cooperation more difficult than when the
gains available from joint political activity are equal and well known, and
when the temptation to free-ride is the only hurdle confronting the group.
But as a matter of fairness, a world with small numbers of employees in
need of expensive accommodations makes differential impact a source of
concern. 65 Highly burdened enterprises cannot pass on the costs of ADA-
(iii) The overall financial resources of the covered entity, the overall size of the business of
the covered entity with respect to the number of its employees, and the number, type and location
of its facilities;
(v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the im-
pact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility's abil-
ity to conduct business.
29 CFR § 16 30.2(p)( 2 ) (1997). This regulation largely tracks the language of the underlying statute.
See42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
63 If an employee can find alternative sources of funding for an accommodation, including self-
financing, an employer must provide the accommodation even if it would have been excused from pro-
viding the accommodation itself on grounds of "hardship." See 29 C.F.R. App. to Part 1630, Interpre-
tive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 1630.2(p) Undue Hardship, at
357 (West Supp. 1997).
64 With no accommodation there is no job, inasmuch as an individual must be able to "perform the
essential functions of the employment position" to be considered a "qualified individual" covered by the
antidiscrimination statute. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).
65 In contrast, enterprises will be subject to the same structural modification requirements laid down
in the Act; those responsibilities exist regardless of the particular characteristics of a business's work
force or customer base. The idea is to make future access possible for all persons, including disabled
persons, without expensive retrofitting or alterations. A few competitors may be disadvantaged because
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required employee accommodations to customers because these enterprises
must compete for customers with enterprises that are less burdened by the
ADA. Once again, tax deductions may provide some relief and with it a
"fairer" distribution of the costs of regulation. Still, the scheme perhaps
unnecessarily affects employers in disparate fashion. Finally, something
less than a tax deduction may be allowed because structural and other in-
vestments must be amortized over many years rather than immediately de-
ducted on the next tax return. This treatment may make sense, at least in
the overall context of the income tax, if these improvements will be used by
an employee over a multi-year period;66 when the accommodated employee
leaves early, however, continuing to defer the deduction is inconsistent with
general tax principles as well as overly harsh to the employer.
To the extent that the fairness perspective under development here
draws attention to the tax system and the implicit baseline it offers, the fair-
ness argument can be restated in the following terms: We would be hard
pressed to justify a tax system that imposed special burdens on employers
who happened to employ disabled employees. A forced redistribution of
wealth from employers to employees as a form of reparations or compensa-
tion similarly lacks justification; these employers rarely caused their em-
ployees' disabilities. And if we permit fairness concerns to drift over to
efficiency considerations, it is worth observing that an employer faced with
an employee in need of accommodation is unlikely to be better situated
economically to solve this problem, or be a least cost avoider, than are tax-
payers more generally or competing employers with no such employees.
This comparison across employers returns us to the conditional nature
of the employee accommodation mandate as opposed to the structural
modifications mandate. When an employer can prove that the necessary
accommodations create a business "hardship," its duty to provide them
evaporates. This generally leaves the disabled individual bearing the finan-
cial burden of his or her disabilities. Though this arbitrary allocation of
hardship is no more or less fair than the equally arbitrary allocation of its
burden to a particular employer who happened to employ the disabled indi-
of the style of their architecture and so forth, but there is almost surely less variation than that generated
by the distribution of disabled employees.
66 The accommodation may be viewed as just another capital investment used to generate income
over a series of years, or the economic equivalent of paying the disabled employee a higher salary each
year. Though this approach corresponds to tax logic, it may seem less logical to employers interested in
bringing their economic and tax situations into conformity with employers that have no disabled em-
ployees. On the other hand, to allow the up-front deduction of such costs might bias employers against
accommodations that involved recurring, rather than one-time, capital investments.
67 Unless, of course, there is some reason to believe either that the employer was responsible for
creating the disability or, because of some form of market failure, was able to exploit the worker by, in
the absence of government intervention, paying the worker a lower wage than would be justified by the
worker's productivity.
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vidual,65 it may seem less fair than allocating the burden to society as a
whole. The "hardship" rule thus provides another example of how the nec-
essary constraints of an unfunded program disadvantage some of the in-
tended beneficiaries of the ADA.
3. Environmental Directives.-We come last to an example of un-
funded regulation that seems less likely to suffer from the sort of fairness
and efficiency problems associated with interemployer comparisons with
respect to the accommodation portions of the ADA. The environmental
regulations imposed by such statutes as the Clean Air Act,69 Federal Water
Pollution Control, 70 and Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Ace'
generally affect enterprises in a given industry rather similarly; firms need
to spend to reduce pollution or waste, or they need to absorb the cost of for-
going various business activities. Once again, numerous objections have
been raised to the rulemaking and its federalization,72 and there is even
some discussion of the unfunded nature of the directives,73 but relatively
little attention has been paid to the way these enactments burden selected
industries while allowing citizens more generally to enjoy "free" environ-
mental improvements. 74 As with the other examples in this Part, businesses
bear a portion of the costs generated by the statutory schemes and they may
form something of an appropriate interest group to compete with the imper-
fect representatives on the other side, who favor unfunded regulation. The
funded alternative is also rife with monitoring difficulties because of the
situation-specific nature of the required adjustments.
One important difference reflected in this example of unfunded regula-
tion lies in the relatively fair and efficient distribution of its costs. Passing
68 If an employer is forced out of business, nearly all the firm's employees will be worse off. If not,
it remains difficult to see why the employer is asked to bear the cost of this social policy. The employer
is likely to be neither a useful cost-avoider nor insurer.
69 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1995).
70 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1995).
71 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1995).
72 See, e.g., Henry K. Butler & Jonathan K. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulation Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23 (1996); Na-
tional Academy of Public Administration Summary Report to Congress on Role, Structure of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency Released April 12, 1995, Env't Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 13, 1995) (calling for
"'accountable devolution' of national programs and on a reduction in EPA oversight").
73 Virtually all of this criticism is directed at those portions of the Acts that impose unfunded man-
dates on subordinate governments, rather than unfunded regulations on business entities. See, e.g.,
Dana, supra note 5, at 5-6; Steinzor, supra note 5, at 104-11.
74 Indeed, the commentary that exists stresses the equalizing feature of these laws. Specifically,
some environmental legislation has been criticized for eliminating cost or market advantages formerly
enjoyed by "naturally" clean participants in an industry. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, CLEAN
COAL/DIRTY AIR 11 (1981). There is somewhat more discussion of the private burden-public benefit
issue with respect to environmental laws such as the Endangered Species Act in which the economic
burdens vary considerably within an industry.
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on costs serves neither fairness nor efficiency goals if those who pay the
passed-on costs bear no particular relationship to the beneficiaries of a
regulation or to the source of the problem that gives rise to it. For example,
there is no particular reason to think that consumers of fast food, purchased
from firms in the practice of employing low-wage workers, ought to pay for
the social welfare goals reflected in minimum-wage legislation. In contrast,
it may be sensible as a matter of internalization and fair as a matter of
claims on resources if these consumers, along with others who are heavy
users of paper products, pay a suitable fraction of the water pollution costs
associated with the manufacture of paper goods. These consumers might
essentially be charged user fees that are more direct and defensible than the
"fees" charged to consumers of fast food when prices in that industry reflect
minimum-wage legislation.
If unfunded environmental regulation often amounts to the imposition
of user fees, then any case against the unfunded character of the regulation
will be quite weakened. An obvious analogy can be drawn to the law of
takings, which distinguishes between regulations abating common-law nui-
sances and regulations redistributing property away from innocent private
owners; only the latter constitute compensable takings.75 Plainly, environ-
mental regulations that force the internalization of social costs that had for-
merly been externalized on others present the strongest case for unfunded
regulations.
To the extent that fairness concerns remain because of differential im-
pacts on competing firms, as when one firm has older, dirtier equipment or
finds itself near environmentally sensitive areas, net compliance costs and
interfirm differentials will again be partly reduced through the tax system
because of deductible expenses and the government's penchant for sharing
in all gains and most losses.76 In an important sense, all taxpayers share in
most costs imposed on firms by government regulation because the gov-
ernment loses when profits fall.
It is likely that there is more sharing when regulations lead to deducti-
ble expenditures than when revenues are simply reduced because firms
contract. Regulations sometimes require firms to do things that many
would have done anyway. Funding these regulations then provides wind-
75 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (stating and applying
the nuisance-redistribution distinction). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapters of Oregon: The Law and Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 SUPREME CT. ECON. REv. 1,
28-31 (1997) (discussing nuisance law); Levmore, supra note 4, at 1340 (developing positive theory on
the basis of the distinction); Robert E. Litan, Comment on Fischel's Political Economy of Just Compen-
sation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65, 65-66 (1996) (distinguishing between regulatory actions
"which may diminish the value of property in order to achieve a larger public purpose, but where the
property owner has caused not harm" and "regulatory actions specifically designed to internalize an ex-
temality"). But see Fischel, supra note 2, at 54-55 (arguing that "one can characterize any beneficial
activity as preventing the 'harm' of foregoing if').
76 Moreover, greater fairness or neutrality is virtually impossible to obtain.
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falls to these firms. More generally, even when regulations affect behavior,
these behavioral changes likely add some value to the firm. A firm that is
required to offer certain unfunded fringe benefits to its employees may gain
a portion of the value of these fringe benefits not only from its workers'
satisfaction but also from a new ability to attract better workers or to reduce
explicit wages to workers.77 Even the after-tax costs of such regulation,
then, overstate the true cost to the enterprise because the calculation process
disregards such offsetting benefits. In contrast, a firm likely gains noth-
ing-though reduced external effects may be socially beneficial-when a
regulation simply reduces its revenues and the government's corresponding
tax, or forces the firm to cease or contract its operations.78
It is plausible that deductibility is a decent proxy for expenditures that
produce some private benefits to the target of regulation, while regulations
that merely reduce a firn's income are better associated with compliance
that produces no private benefit. If this is so, then the relationship between
deductibility and fairness is fairly straightforward. The government's co-
payment constitutes a greater fraction of the true cost, including offsetting
benefits, of deductible expenditures than one would think from looking at
the taxpayer's marginal tax rate, while the marginal rate accurately reflects
the amount of the government's and fellow taxpayers' copayment in de-
creased revenue situations. Of course, as explained earlier, most regulatory
situations create both an increase in deductible expenditures and some de-
creases in revenues.7 9
B. Directives Aimed at Individuals
It is useful to scout terrain that is yet further removed from that occu-
pied by intergovernmental mandates. I do this by considering directives
aimed not at organizations comparable to subordinate governments, but
rather at individuals who are more numerous but less politically organized
than the entities discussed to this point. When a federal directive imposes
losses on a very few individuals, and these losers are neither implicitly
compensated nor acting wrongfully, the Constitution normally requires the
payment of compensation. The public choice explanation is so obvious that
it has not needed that modem label. When, however, rulemaking brings on
military conscription or speed limits or restrictions on foreign travel, af-
fecting numerous but dispersed individuals, the law chooses not to require
compensation for disadvantaged interest groups. Numerosity normally pre-
77 The firm may not always benefit. A requirement that a firm build higher smokestacks is unlikely
to benefit the firm unless the improvement in air quality is so great that health insurance premiums for
the firm's employees are reduced.
78 See supra notes 64 & 68 and accompanying text (justifying hardship exception to ADA require-
ments).
79 See supra note 14 (discussing mixed effect of minimum wage).
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cludes constitutional protection80° This is so even though the numerosity
may create a public choice problem rather than solve it. Though numeros-
ity can confer political power, it is unlikely to do so when class members
only vote and do not organize to pursue their interests through other means.
The dispersal of costs among large numbers of voters may paradoxically
rob individual voters of the incentive for political action, leading to the ab-
sence of desired checks and balances. It goes almost without saying that
these numerous "victims" find themselves in the very situation that taxpay-
ers would face were funded mandates or other regulations to replace un-
funded ones.
When the public choice perspective fails to justify a particular funding
structure, a sensitivity to agency costs or moral hazard problems often dem-
onstrates the superiority of unfunded over funded regulations. False claims
and inefficient activity would abound in a system that promised to compen-
sate those who were burdened by highway speed limits or restrictions on
travel. Full compensation for conscripts would bring on other well-known
problems."1
Perhaps the most interesting thing about a comparison between un-
funded regulations applied to businesses-applied in situations in which
business firms serve as obvious intermediaries for groups of individuals-
and those directed at individuals is that these dispersed, uncompensated indi-
viduals are generally unable to use the tax system to share their losses with
other citizens.8 2 Liberty is not taxed as imputed income, and restrictions on
liberty-an important variety of the costs imposed directly on individuals-
do not give rise to deductions.8 3 These burdens are shared only in the sense
that they normally fall on a great many people.
A quick glance at the examples provided in Part II suggests that regu-
lations aimed at individuals-particularly those that take the form of re-
strictions on liberty-ought to be scrutinized more carefully than those
directed at businesses and governments. Individuals, unlike businesses and
governments, usually do not have preexisting organizations devoted to
overcoming the collective action problems inherent in lobbying efforts.
These collective action problems may be more intense in the individual
context because of the nonmonetary nature of the interests at issue. Finally,
the loss-spreading mechanism provided by the tax system provides no relief
go See Levmore, supra note 4, at 1344-48.
81 See Fischel, supra note 2, for an interesting perspective on the rise and fall of the draft.
82 To the extent that a conscript loses foregone earnings there is some sharing in the sense that the
government collects less in the way of taxes. On the other hand, many conscripts do not feel bettered by
the imposition. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (generalizing about the difference be-
tween sharing through deductibility and mere income reduction).
83 Even on those occasions when the restrictions increase an individual's out-of-pocket costs, de-
duction of the cost increase will be barred because the expenditure in question will be characterized as a
"personal, living, or family" expense. I.R.C. § 262 (disallowing deductions for personal, living, or fam-
ily expenses).
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in the absence of monetary injury. The counterargument is that, with all
due respect to modem public choice thinking, there is some safety in num-
bers and some protection in the fact that restrictions on individuals continue
to attract a kind of media and academic attention not often found when the
nominal losers are employers or subordinate governments.
III. RECONSIDERING MANDATES
Many of the mandates that lead subordinate governments to complain
apply to employers generally. For example, the three employer mandates
discussed in Part II apply to subordinate governments as well as private
actors.84 Other mandates, however, apply to activities performed largely or
solely by subordinate governments. The Education of All Handicapped
Children Act, for example, requires public school systems to provide cer-
tain services to disabled students,85 while the Family Support Act of 1988
requires states to extend Medicaid services to previously ineligible groups
of people.86 Similarly, the Clean Water Act imposes wastewater treatment
standards87 and the Safe Drinking Water Act sets standards for the operation
of public water systems.8 Subordinate government behavior may also be
controlled by the federal, or state, government's subsidizing local govern-
ment activity, by requiring such activity and compensating for the associ-
84 Although Congress adopted minimum-wage legislation covering private employers in 1938, it did
not attempt to impose the minimum-wage laws on state employees until 1974. These amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act were initially overturned in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), but then accepted in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The
definition of "employer" subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA excepts "the United
States, a corporation wholly owned by the government of the United States, or an Indian tribe," 42
U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B) (West Supp. 1998), but not state or local governments or their agencies. Not
only are subordinate governmental entities subject to the specific regulations contained in the various
environmental laws, but also they have been delegated implementation and enforcement responsibilities
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1995), the Safe Drinking Water Act,
42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (1995), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926,
6946 (1995), and the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1995). The extent to which
the latter can survive constitutional challenge following the decision in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
98 (1997), remains an open question. The portions of these statutes that apply with equal force to pri-
vate businesses as well as state agencies have been deemed less problematic by previous commentators
on public choice grounds. See La Pierre, supra note 5, at 648-49 (political checks imposed by private
entities provide "vicarious protection" against federal overreaching). Moreover, to the extent the activi-
ties of state and local governments overlap with those provided by for-profit enterprises in such areas as
garbage collection and utility provision, anything less than uniform application of the rules would create
competitive concerns.
85 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1995).
86 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (1988).
87 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1995).
s8 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(g)(1)-(6) (1995).
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ated costs of funded mandates, or by demanding payments from subordi-
nates that choose to avoid undertaking the desired activity.89
The closest we come to the last scheme is when expected transfers
from the federal government are suddenly conditioned on previously un-
constrained, and somewhat unrelated, performance. For instance, recent
federal legislation withholds previously available highway funds from
states that do not conform to federal wishes regarding minimum age re-
quirements for the consumption of alcohol. 90 These and other "subsidies"
risk being characterized as unconstitutional conditions, but that subject need
not distract us here. Our puzzle, if it is still that, is the special criticism re-
served for unfunded mandates, under which the subordinate governments
have little choice but to conform.91  I proceed under the assumption that
much of this criticism would subside if the federal government attached
payments to its orders, and that the critics would surely relent if the federal
strategy were always to employ subsidies that subordinate governments
could choose to decline.92
A. Public Choice Considerations
The case against mandates focuses on the likelihood that Congress can
regulate in a way that satisfies some interest groups while hiding the burden
imposed on other interests and voters-and sometimes even from them-
selves. If this imbalance between winners and losers is indeed a character-
istic of, or even the explanation for unfunded mandates, then inefficient and
excessive regulation is likely. From a public choice perspective, the danger
might be the rent-seeking that accompanies regulation, as resources are
wasted in influencing Congress to regulate at the expense of presumably
underrepresented subordinate governments and their constituents. Either
way, federal legislators may benefit through the pockets or votes of those
who stand to gain from mandates while these legislators need not worry as
much about the negative reactions of those who will lose.
s9 See Michael Fix & Daphne A. Kenyon, Introduction to COPING WITH MANDATES: WHAT ARE
THE ALTERNATIVES? 3 (Michael Fix & Daphne Kenyon eds., 1990).
90 See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1995) (linking receipt of highway funds to establishment of minimum
drinking age); 23 U.S.C. § 153 (linking receipt of highway funds to state enactment of seat belt and
motorcycle helmet requirements). Federal highway funds have served as a recurring tool of persuasion.
91 Unless, of course, the point of the federal rulemaking is to generate supposed gains from uni-
formity, in which case an opt-out provision would be self-defeating.
92 1 do not mean to suggest that the subsidies would not generate independent criticism; they may be
attacked as a waste of the government's money. Moreover, overly generous subsidies may be regarded
by some as the equivalent of compulsion-offers that are "too good to be refused." See William J.
Klein, Pressure or Compulsion? Federal Highway Fund Sanctions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990,26 RUTGERS L.J. 855 (1995). But see Hills, supra note 11, at 862-63.
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Putting the case against unfunded mandates this way makes clear that it
rests on questionable empirical foundations.93 First, even assuming voters
begin ignorant of the source of their financial burdens, they can rectify their
ignorance through education. Further, if one is willing to assume irre-
trievably ignorant voters, one must question whether such ignorant voters
would effectively oppose funded mandates. Indeed, it seems reasonable to
believe that by burdening relatively interested, educated, and organized in-
termediaries, such as state and local governments, unfunded mandates actu-
ally provide a more effective counterweight against special interest groups
than would funded mandates. Each of these points is discussed in more
detail below.
The case against unfunded mandates relies either on the presence of
unsophisticated voters94 or on a systematic pattern of weaker interest groups
at the local cost-bearing level than at the federal benefit-enjoying level.95
Even if voters, as an initial matter, misunderstand the source of their gov-
ernmental spending requirements, this ignorance need not last forever. The
cost of complying locally with a given mandate falls on the very voters and
taxpayers who are told at the national level that they are getting something
for nothing. If they pay attention to the finances of their states and locali-
ties, they will realize the truth and take the appropriate political action.9 6
93 The argument about political accountability, and some of the specific points made here, form the
thrust of the earlier, excellent piece by David Dana. See Dana, supra note 5.
94 The unsophisticated voter is the key element in Ed Zelinsky's model. See Zelinsky, supra note 3,
at 1374 ("Further postulate that there is slack in the agency relationship between legislators and the
electorate .... Assume additionally that the unsophisticated anti-service voter does not comprehend the
import of the unfunded mandate as state legislators thereby impose services without any perceptible
state tax increases to signal the corresponding costs.").
95 One complaint leveled against unfunded mandates is that, were the matter left to local voters, the
mandate would not have passed. In short, local priorities differ from national ones or the ones set by the
national legislature. This is, of course, more a complaint about national intrusion into the subject matter
being regulated or mandated than about the funded or unfunded nature of the mandate itself. If the
mandate were funded, after all, local residents would find themselves paying for the mandate through
their federal tax payments; there would be no guarantee that this levy would be any smaller than the one
assessed at a more local level as the result of an unfunded level. Indeed, in his article, David Dana sug-
gests that some localities may prefer unfunded mandates to funded mandates precisely because their ju-
risdictions bear lower costs under the unfunded mandates scenario. See Dana, supra note 5, at 26-27.
Nonetheless, it may be harder for residents to identify their personal contribution towards the cost of
federally funded mandates than of mandates funded at a more local level, which may make the burden
more politically acceptable but also less likely to be subject to effective monitoring by the electorate.
See Garrett, supra note 7 (noting the difficulty of monitoring particular expenditures at federal level).
96 Whether these actions will be successful is another issue; they may fail because of the dispersed
costs-concentrated benefits phenomenon. However, this impediment to success exists whether the fed-
eral government provides the benefits in funded or unfunded form. Moreover, it is possible to tell a
story in which the lack of voter sophistication leads to too little legislation rather than too much. If the
beneficiaries, as opposed to the general public, misattribute benefits to state or local politicians, federal
officials would be denied political gains from passing legislation. Indeed, the result might be too little
federal regulation.
HeinOnline  -- 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 376 1998-1999
Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates
The question is whether they can be made to pay such attention. If
they can, any public choice problem that exists will turn out to be a transi-
tion problem. In fact, the dynamics of the political process should be suffi-
cient to dispel the ignorance of voters. If there is indeed a kind of
information asymmetry, such that Congress issues unfunded mandates in
order to enjoy gain without pain because of uninformed losers, then state
and local politicians should be expected to educate their constituents.97 In
fact, there are indications that they are beginning to do that.98 As the suc-
cess of corporate "voter education programs" has shown,99 voters do re-
spond when information is provided to them in easily accessible form.
Moreover, the more egregious the behavior of mandating governments, the
more susceptible voters will be to such educational efforts.100 Voters who
may have once "tuned-out" state and local politics will become more inter-
ested as the monetary stakes rise. In short, if the problem with unfunded
mandates results entirely from the presence of uninformed voters, then the
problem may be short-lived.
Further, most of the critics of unfunded mandates ignore the independ-
ent political power of state and local government units. If gross ineffi-
ciency or information asymmetry exists, or if voters persist in their
ignorance, states and localities can be expected to try to influence Congress
directly to eschew unwise unfunded mandates. Subordinate governments
do, to be sure, face something of a collective action problem because man-
dates are generally aimed at all states or at least at many states. But it is
hard to see why subordinate governments should be expected to be less
powerful in the federal political arena than individuals or even the largest
business firms and industries, which also face this sort of collective action
problem. Indeed, subordinate governments-like businesses and unlike
most individuals-have already created structures to overcome these col-
lective action problems.' 0 '
97 See Dana, supra note 5, at 20.
98 See id. at 20 n.53. The extensive coverage of the unfunded mandates issue in both the popular
and academic presses may be regarded as both the means of and evidence of the success of such efforts.
99 Many commentators have decried the success of corporate advertising campaigns on topics such
as 'bottle bills." See David R. Lagasse, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power and the
Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1347, 1348 (1995) (decrying effectiveness of corporate-
sponsored campaign expenditures against environmental initiatives).
100 Voters need not be perfectly educated in order to place responsibility where it belongs. Of
course, knowledge may not change their voting behavior; they may decide that their general satisfaction
with a particular politician outweighs their anger at his or her complicity in passing a particularly expen-
sive and unwanted mandate. However, the same absence of political reaction could follow the enact-
ment of a federally funded mandate. The real issue or "problem" here is that citizens' votes are always
implicit logrolls; voters rarely get to express their preference regarding individual issues at any level of
government. The federal level may be the worst in this regard because of the multiplicity of diverse is-
sues controlled by federal legislators.
101 There are about 60 organizations representing state and local public officials and governments.
The influential "big seven" include the Council of State Governments, International City Management
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The organizational ability of subordinate governments and Tullock's
theory of countervailing interest groups 02 suggests that, on public choice
grounds alone, unfunded mandates may be superior to funded intergovern-
mental directives. State and local governments, or the interests that they tax
or service, may balance or offset those interest groups that stand to gain
from intergovernmental mandates.'0 3 When funded mandates may simply
burden dispersed taxpayers across the country or unidentifiable future tax-
payers who will one day repay money the federal government now borrows,
unfunded mandates may shift the burden to subordinate governments.
These local government units may be far superior political intermediaries
than those who would enter the fray under the alternative of funded man-
dates or modest subsidies. 0 4 It is noteworthy that, for what is probably it-
self explained by public choice reasoning, the federal government is much
more likely to resort to debt than are state and local governments.10 5 The
immediacy of payment at the state and local government levels adds to the
sense that impositions threatened against these governments will stimulate
political reaction superior to that generated by federal mandates funded
through debt.1
0 6
Association, National Association of Counties, National Conference of State Legislatures, National
Governors' Association, National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Most of these
organizations moved their headquarters to Washington, D.C., with the growth of the federal grant pro-
grams in the 1960s and 1970s. See Garrett, supra note 7, at 1121; see also DAVID S. ARNOLD &
JEREMY F. PLANT, PUBLIC OFFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A BRIDGE
ACROSS ONE HUNDRED YEARS 167-87 (1994); Dale Krane, State Efforts to Influence Federal Policy, in
WELFARE SYSTEM REFORM: COORDINATING FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS 143, 152-53 (Edward T. Jennings Jr. & Neal S. Zank eds., 1993); Jae-Won Yoo & Deil S.
Wright, Public Policy and Intergovernmental Relations: Measuring Perceived Change(s) in National
Influence-The Effects of the Federalism Decade, 21 POL'Y STUD. J. 687, 695-96 (1993).
102 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tullock's theory of counter-
vailing interest groups.
103 Moreover, the beneficiaries are often ideally organized and situated for political advantage.
104 See supra note 101 (listing state and local political organizations).
105 See Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 301-03 (1993).
106 Note that an effective balanced budget requirement at the federal level could lead to the creation
of a Tullockian combat between proponents of funded mandates and proponents of other programs and
interest groups that would see their federal allocations correspondingly reduced. Such confrontations
would be inferior to those produced by unfunded mandates in two respects. First, in the absence of a
rational basis for choosing among potential revenue offsets, more effort would be expended on passing
the burden of such offsets onto others than on defending the relative merits of the competing spending
programs. See supra note 28. Second, this tendency towards unproductive rent-seeking would be exac-
erbated by the fact that the parties with the most knowledge about mandates would have an institutional
stake in supporting them, regardless of their overall social value. See infra text at note 108 (detailing
benefits to state and local governments of federal spending). Thus the quality of useful information pro-
vided to legislators may decline. Moreover, the option of raising taxes may provide an escape from
even this diminished Tullockian competition. Though critics of mandates assume that ignorant constitu-
encies are capable of monitoring exercises of the taxing power, recent history suggests otherwise. See
Glenn E. Coven, Congress As Indian-Giver: "Phasing-Out" Tax Allowances Under the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REV. 505, 526 (1987); James Edward Maule, Getting Hamr'd: Highest
Applicable Marginal Rates That Nail Unsuspecting Taxpayers, 53 TAX NOTES 1423, 1429 (1991).
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Several commentators have suggested that agency problems will pre-
vent states and localities from adequately protecting their constituents' in-
terests in this regard.10 7 While it is undoubtedly true that, like all agents,
state and local officials have interests that diverge from those of their prin-
cipals, the divergence would militate in the direction of excessive rather
than insufficient "protection" against unfunded mandates. After all, as op-
ponents of unfunded mandates regularly claim, state and local officials can
be seen as the primary victims of such mandates. They are saddled with the
financing responsibilities that bring political opprobrium but denied politi-
cal credit for the benefits purchased with those funds. As such, it would be
in their political and personal interests to discourage even sensible un-
funded mandates; their opposition to irresponsible or unnecessary ones can
be taken for granted. Interestingly, the significant divergence of interest
that troubles opponents of unfunded mandates appears much more likely in
the case of funded mandates. Indeed, these subordinate governments might
lobby for funded-or, of course, for overfunded-mandates when there is
some gain to uniformity or when there is some political gain to a claim that
the federal government forced certain policies on the states and localities-
or because they smell pork-barrel opportunities.
Perhaps the safest intuition is that there are at least some areas in which
state and local governments are politically well situated. Informational ad-
vantages and experience can give subordinate governments and their estab-
lished agencies special credibility. Environmental controls, social welfare
programs, criminal enforcement strategies, and educational reforms come to
mind as areas in which there may be evolution toward federal regulation but
in which there is also subordinate government expertise. This expertise can
translate into political influence at the federal level.' °8 It is perhaps not en-
tirely circular to add that the weaponry of better information may be further
improved by the support available to these "victimized" subordinate gov-
ernments under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.'09
107 See, ag., Garrett, supra note 7, at 1127-31.
105 See Garrett, supra note 7, at 1126; Krane, supra note 101, at 148 (noting importance of expertise
in drafting legislation); see also Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional
Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAw. 301, 335-37 (1988)
(detailing institutional links that prevent state and local governments from being "just another interest
group").
109 See UMRA, 2 U.S.C.A. § 602 et seq. (West 1997), Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
Some critics of unfunded mandates view the absence of definitive information regarding the cost of such
mandates as an independent accountability problem. The absence of such information makes meaning-
ful cost-benefit analysis at any level of government impossible. Reckless proposals may therefore gen-
erate little opposition. Of course, this problem afflicts unfunded regulation of private entities as well as
unfunded mandates. An acknowledgment of the ubiquity of this problem can be found in UMRA; its
information requirements apply to both types of unfunded directives. Title I of UMRA, among other
things, requires the Congressional Budget Office to estimate the direct costs of proposed unfunded man-
dates, when such mandates are expected to impose burdens exceeding specified thresholds. See 2
U.S.C.A. §§ 658c(a)-(c) (West 1997) (establishing a $50 million threshold for intergovernmental man-
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I do not mean to suggest that state and local governments are always in
a position to influence federal law and politics. With respect to some is-
sues, subordinate governments may be better able to shift costs onto other
losers than to block federal directives. Some federal directives that are at
their core unwise or inefficient, either in terms of substance or in terms of
their press for uniformity across states, may survive attacks by even politi-
cally capable states. But on balance it seems that unfunded mandates may
well pose less of a problem than do other categories of unfunded federal
regulation and even certain categories of funded regulation.
If there is a special public choice case to be made on behalf of regu-
lated subordinate governments, then it might build on distinctions that have
played little role in the discussion and literature thus far. It is, for example,
remotely possible that state and local governments are at a relative disad-
vantage in the political process because they are subject to special con-
straints limiting their ability to contribute to federal candidates."0 The
ability to provide or hold back in-kind services that have monetary value,
not to mention the ability of subordinate governments-but not most trade
associations and the like-to tax its constituents, would seem to make this
missing tool of minor importance."' Moreover, an optimist might say that
these funding limitations ensure that state and local politicians will not be
too powerful as compared to private interests, and especially those interests
likely to oppose increased federal debt or funded mandates more generally.
On balance, state and local governments do not seem especially weak in
political and fiscal terms."12
dates and a $100 million threshold for private sector regulations). These estimates of financial burden
must be included in the committee report accompanying the bill proposing the mandate or, if such in-
formation is not ready prior to the publication of this report, in the Congressional Record prior to the
bill's floor consideration. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 658b; Garrett, supra note 7, at 1145. Bills containing man-
dates for which such information is lacking are subject to a "point of order" that must be specifically
waived by majority vote. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 658d; see Garrett, supra note 7, at 1161-63, 1165-67 (ex-
plaining significance of "point of order"). Whether meaningful information can be gathered in all cases
remains an open question but, again, one not unique to unfunded mandates. See Garrett, supra note 7, at
1155-57 (enumerating some of the difficulties with budget estimations for unfunded mandates). The
circularity, of course, is that the Act is a response to criticism of unfunded mandates; its very passage
indicates the influence retained by state and local governments over the federal legislature.
110 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1994) (limiting
the campaign contributions of national and state party organizations to $10,000 for House candidates in
general elections and $20,000 or 2 cents per voter for Senate candidates in general elections).
111 See Dana, supra note 5, at 23; Garrett, supra note 7, at 1124-26; Lee, supra note 108, at 335-36.
112 Another argument made against unfunded mandates is that spending on federal priorities may
squeeze out funding for former state priorities and, in particular, state-funded social welfare programs.
The argument goes as follows: In determining its tax rate, a jurisdiction trades off the benefits of at-
tracting more tax base by lowering its rate against the cost of reducing the tax rate applicable to the base
already located within the jurisdiction. If an unfunded mandate causes a state to raise its tax rate, the
nature of the trade-off changes because the higher the state tax rate, the stronger the incentive to attract
additional increments to the state tax base. The way to attract the base is to lower the state tax rate. Of
course, lowering the state tax rate changes the trade-off in the opposite direction; it is hard to predict the
new equilibrium. The empirical evidence is equivocal. States raised taxes to replace federal grants-in-
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B. Intergovernmental Agency Costs
Governments are not exempt from the general rule that it is easier to
spend another's money than one's own; indeed, this is precisely the claim
made by opponents of unfunded mandates and of government programs
generally. But once we adopt the perspective suggested here, comparing
funded and unfunded regulation, no clear conclusion follows from the ax-
iom about externalized costs. If intergovernmental mandates were funded,
separation would remain between implementation and cost-absorption. In-
stead of being ordered to do things by a non-paying master, subordinate
governments would now be in a position to choose means toward mandated
ends unconstrained by costs.1 13 The result would be something like a fed-
eral entitlement program. Subordinate governments would have little rea-
son to exercise restraint in drawing on the blank check given by the federal
government for fulfillment of a mandate. Expenditures with little if any ef-
fect on the achievement of the federal mandate would provide opportunities
for a subordinate government to employ more people, perhaps on a patron-
age basis, perhaps not, but always with the effect of pumping more money
into the local economy. It would allow them to purchase more goods from
either local or politically favored suppliers.1 14 The subordinate government
would not be subject to an effective political check for such wasteful prac-
tices because its constituents would see only the benefits and none or few of
the detriments from such spending. Thus, subordinate governments could
not be depended upon to adequately monitor the cost-effectiveness of deci-
sions made by their bureaucrats and the bureaucrats have their own inde-
pendent reasons to overspend." 5
The funding government would, of course, have an incentive to moni-
tor the behavior of recipients and to issue subsidiary rules to control waste.
aid eliminated by the Reagan Administration rather than reducing spending, but in recent years, spend-
ing cuts may be the predominant response to cuts in federal aid. See Hills, supra note 11, at 864 &
n.289 and accompanying text. Note that this argument is slightly different from the more standard ar-
gument that competition from other states will prevent a state from raising taxes to finance federal man-
dates and, thus, the state will have to cut other state spending due to competition from other states. That
argument fails to persuade unless the costs of the federal mandates fall unequally among states. Other-
wise, all states will have to raise taxes by approximately the same amount, leaving each in the same
competitive position relative to each other as existed prior to the enactment of the federal mandate.
113 The federal government could, of course, mandate means instead of merely ends, virtually
eliminating the distinction between "mandates" and federal programs. Doing so, however, would un-
dercut the initial rationale for implementing programs through subordinate governments rather than the
federal bureaucracy. /
114 Alternatively, jurisdictions may try to pass off their own routine spending obligations as attribut-
able to-and thus reimbursable by-the federal program. The limited experience with state bookkeep-
ing in the mandate area intensifies such concerns. State and local organizations have routinely
submitted highly exaggerated estimates of the cost of federal mandates. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at
1184-86.
115 See ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 94, 247 (1966); JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY 69-71 (1989) (internal logic of bureaucracies leads to empire-building).
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But this sort of monitoring and controlling can be difficult. Two common
reasons for choosing mandates rather than federal spending programs in the
first place are to allow local variations in response to local conditions and to
facilitate local experimentation with methods of achieving the mandated
goals.'1 6 Local variation and experimentation make monitoring and con-
trolling problematic. If, for example, waste is controlled by ex post facto
auditing of effectiveness, then experimentation will be discouraged because
local governments will have a strong incentive to act in ways that guarantee
reimbursement rather than long-term efficiency. In short, a strong case can
be made for preferring unfunded mandates over funded mandates on agency
cost grounds.
There is, of course, the countervailing concern about underprovision.
The absence of external funding undoubtedly causes subordinate govern-
ments to reduce costs in undesirable as well as desirable ways. Like private
employers, local governments may shy away from hiring expensive, dis-
abled employees. Or they may pick a relatively inexpensive method for at-
taining a legislative goal that does not, in fact, attain the goal. Or they may
decide to avoid providing a service altogether, relegating its provision to
private enterprises. Unfunded mandates may be inappropriate except as a
form of political window-dressing in situations in which the federal gov-
ernment cannot effectively monitor the attainment of its desired goals. Of
course, funded mandates often do not fare much better in such situations.
As in the earlier discussion of the ADA, the choice of funding mechanisms
often reduces to a choice of the lesser of three evils, the third being to do
nothing at all.
C. Sharing Through Taxation
The burden of governmental mandates will often fall unequally across
jurisdictions, whether that burden is measured on a per capita or other ba-
sis.117 But governments, unlike employers, are not taxpaying entities, and
their extraordinary costs are therefore not simply reflected back onto tax-
payers at large through the deductibility of expenses. Subordinate govern-
ments, unlike employers and more like individuals, thus bear the brunt of
any inequities in the allocation of fiscal responsibilities through mandates.
It appears, then, that what really distinguishes unfunded mandates from un-
funded regulation is not the public choice problem, which has been the fo-
116 The desire-or need-to grant flexibility in the means of achieving desired goals clearly in-
creases the attractiveness of unfunded mandates or regulations. Although agency issues arise in other
situations, alternative monitoring devices are available when the desired behavior is sufficiently certain
to make reasonable estimates of the cost of compliance possible.
117 See Michael Fix, Observations on Mandating, in COPING WITH MANDATES: WHAT ARE THE
ALTERNATIVES?, supra note 89, at 36 (estimating per capita costs of 6 mandates as ranging from $51.50
to $6 in different jurisdictions). Cost variations can be attributable to any number of factors, ranging
from physical conditions within particular states to residential patterns to prior political decisions and
expenditure patterns.
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cus of most of the commentary, but rather the possibility of striking ine-
quality or "unfairness" in the distribution of the short-term, and sometimes
long-term, economic burdens imposed by the mandates. This relative un-
fairness, or distinction between unfunded mandates and other unfunded
regulation, can be traced to the sometime availability of the ameliorating
aspects of the federal tax system.
This distinction or, perhaps, flaw-if it can be called that-in the op-
eration of unfunded mandates should not be overstated. There is, after all,
just a possibility rather than a probability of heightened inequality. On oc-
casion, mandated actions will improve the lives or businesses of residents
of the subordinate governments, or they will offset damage caused by these
subordinates' activities and function in the manner of user fees. Further,
the unfairness that is created is not entirely unique to subordinate govern-
ments. Although businesses can deduct their costs of complying with gov-
ernmental regulations, the consumers that purchase goods and services at
"inflated" prices often cannot.118 The tax system thus ameliorates only part
of the total compliance cost of most regulations. And, as previously dis-
cussed, most individual mandates do not give rise to tax-deductible expen-
ditures.
Although subordinate governments cannot share their burden through
the tax system, they pass on compliance costs to their own "customers,"
which is to say the taxpayers in their jurisdictions. 9 Some of these tax-
payers can then claim deductions against their federal income tax for state
and local tax payments, just as some of the price increases will be borne by
deduction-claiming businesses. Admittedly, this option may be available to
just a minority of taxpayers, because such deductions can be claimed only
by businesses and itemizers120 and only with respect to certain types of state
118 See supra note 83 (nondeductibility of personal expenses).
119 Indeed, another argument in favor of unfunded mandates may be that changing the financing en-
tity entails a change in the financing mechanism. Congressional advocates of consumption taxation, for
example, may prefer more extensive utilization of sales and property taxes relative to income taxes.
Although more direct methods of accomplishing such shifts in financing mechanisms exist, such as re-
storing the tax deduction for state sales taxes, they may not be politically feasible. Proposals to restore
the sales tax deduction, for example, have been opposed on distributional as well as budgetary grounds.
120 To be sure, these itemizers tend to be high eamers so that the percentage of state and local taxes
that is deducted on federal returns is greater than one might think from simply looking at the percentage
of taxpayers who itemize. In 1994, almost 28% of taxpayers and about 79% of those with adjusted gross
incomes of $50,000 and above filed returns claiming an itemized deduction for state and local tax pay-
ments. See Therese M. Cruciano, Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 1994, 15-4 STAT.
INCOME BULL. 6, 18, 23 (Spring 1996) (Table 1). Together, they claimed $105,403,074 of deductions
for state and local income tax payments, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME-1994
INDVDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 78 tbl.2.1; such payments represented about 83% of the total
amount of state and local income taxes collected during the 1994 calendar year. See U.S. Census Bu-
reau, Table 1, National Totals of State and Local Tax Revenue, By Type of Tax (visited on August 28,
1998) <http:llwww.census.gov/govs/qtaxlqtx981tl.txt>. Presumably, a similarly large percentage of the
property taxes collected by local jurisdictions are also claimed as deductions by itemizing taxpayers, al-
though the statistics required to definitively prove this point are unavailable. On the other hand, sales
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and local taxes.1 21 By contrast, an overwhelming fraction of businesses can
deduct or at least capitalize the costs of complying with the unfunded regu-
lations they face.1 22  To the extent that these regulations generate higher
costs for the services or products that businesses buy, these costs are of
course similarly deductible.
D. Summary
Unfunded regulations often seem markedly superior to funded direc-
tives when viewed from an agency cost perspective. This is so whether
those regulations are directed at businesses or subordinate governments-in
the form of what I have labeled as "mandates" rather than broader "regula-
tions." The public choice perspective does not clearly favor either un-
funded or funded mandates. If a special case can be made against unfunded
mandates, then, it needs to be made from a perspective that focuses on the
wealth or income effects of regulation. Unfunded mandates have the po-
tential to alter the fiscal burden among polities and their diverse constitu-
ents and tax bases,1 2' and the impact of unfunded mandates on taxpayers
and others would therefore seem to be critical to any judgment of the desir-
ability of unfunded mandates.
The politics and commentary dealing with unfunded mandates often re-
flect underlying substantive views of federal rulemaking or standards.
Those who oppose a federal standard generally devote at least some of their
energy to criticizing the unfunded format of the mandate, assuming it is
that, while some proponents of a federal standard favor unfunded regulation
over funded regulation. 124 I have tried to suggest that one should set aside
independent views of the federal regulation in question, and that when that
is done, the choice between funded and unfunded directives is rarely obvi-
ous. It undoubtedly depends on the context and specific terms of the man-
date as well as on the collective effects of all such mandates and of the
taxes currently account for about 24% of state and local tax revenues, see U.S. Census Bureau, supra, at
Table 1. They once accounted for about 17% of the taxes deducted by individuals, see Susan Hostetter
& Jeffrey Bates, Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 1987, 8-4 STAT. INCOME BULL. 5, 9
(Spring 1989) (noting that amount of taxes paid deduction decreased by 17.6% in the year state sales
taxes became nondeductible). Sales taxes may not be deducted by individuals unless incurred in con-
nection with a trade or business. Individuals are similarly barred from deducting a host of other miscel-
laneous taxes that account for another approximately 6% of state and local tax revenues. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 164 (1994) (listing deductible taxes); U.S. Census Bureau, United States State and Local Government
Finances by Level of Government: 1993-94 (visited on August 28, 1998)
<httpl/www.census.gov/govs/estimate/94stlus.txt>.
121 Only state income and property taxes are deductible by nonbusiness taxpayers; sales taxes are
not. See 26 U.S.C. § 164.
122 See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (allowing a deduction for "ordinary and necessary business expenses").
123 Indeed, once created, disparities might snowball as taxpayers in high-cost jurisdictions vote with
their feet and move to lower-cost jurisdictions, leaving behind a smaller and perhaps poorer population
to cope with the financial burden.
124 See Dana, supra note 5, at 26.
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various taxes and charges that ultimately finance their implementation. In-
deed, any given subordinate government, apt to complain about unfunded
mandates directed its way, might be pressed by the question of whether it
would prefer all federal mandates to be funded or all to be unfunded.
125
IV. COMPROMISES
These unyielding comparisons of funded and unfunded directives draw
attention to the possibility of compromise, or partial funding. Such com-
promises run the risk of undercutting the agency-cost advantages provided
by schemes without funding. The tax system effects, however, just such a
compromise, at least when costs are placed on employers. This precedent
may indicate that the legal system, or at least the tax system, has decided
that the fairness gains from sharing through tax deductibility outweigh the
concomitant efficiency costs of biasing agents. Partial funding may also as-
suage any continuing discomfort about public choice concerns. The trick, if
this qualifies as one, is to develop partial funding mechanisms that mini-
mize incentives for misbehavior by the subordinate, implementing govern-
ment.
When put this way, the task is familiar to readers who have thought
about contracting problems in general or, closer to home, federal-grants-in-
aid and federal contracting. Without revisiting the broader or narrower lit-
eratures, 126 it should suffice to say that one can choose among a plethora of
familiar arrangements, including matching grants, block grants, and cost-
plus arrangements, and that each comes with advantages and disadvantages.
Other mechanisms, perhaps better suited to private businesses, have been
explored in analogous cost-sharing situations, including medical reim-
bursement arrangements. There is no reason to think that any one arrange-
ment, whether presently found in intergovernmental or private settings, is
best for all intergovernmental directives.
It is worth noting that providing partial funding of intergovernmental
mandates by simply making all state and local tax payments deductible
even to non-itemizers-if only to mimic the treatment of employers who
are subject to unfunded regulation-is probably unwise. State and local tax
revenues do not all go toward the cost of complying with intergovernmental
mandates; the case for allowing an expensive unlimited deduction for non-
125 Their attitude would also be affected by the source of funding. Few subordinate government of-
ficials would be favorably inclined if they knew that federal mandates would be funded by cutting back
on federal block grants and other relatively unconstrained forms of federal aid to states and localities;
they would be much happier-indeed, perhaps too happy, see supra text at notes 107-108-if the money
were to come from the defense budget or new federal tax levies.
126 See generally GEORGE E. PETERSON ET AL., THE REAGAN BLOCK GRANTS: WHAT HAVE WE
LEARNED? (1986); HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 539 (1995); Hills, supra note 11, at 858-65; Jerry
L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of
Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 297 (1996).
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mandate related expenses must be made on independent grounds. 27 Nor
can one easily separate out the portion of the subordinate government ex-
penditures, and hence of the tax payments, attributable to these unfunded
mandates. Moreover, because these mandates affect diverse jurisdictions
differentially, it would be unappealing to employ for this purpose an aver-
age percentage of taxes traceable to unfunded mandates. Unfortunately,
perhaps, a resolution in the direction of uniform cost-sharing would appear
to require a fairly complex mechanism.
V. CONCLUSION
Three points stand out when comparing unfunded intergovernmental
mandates to other forms of regulation. First, the claim that unfunded man-
dates reflect and substantively suffer from a lack of political accountability,
at least relative to other types of unfunded regulation, is unfounded. It is
not just that subordinate governments may be significant players in the fed-
eral political system. It is also that alternative arrangements-in particular
the one of funded mandates preferred by many critics of unfunded man-
dates-would likely lead to even less political accountability. The political
accountability problem is, in short, far more complex than critics of un-
funded mandates have realized. Once those complexities have been unrav-
eled, unfunded mandates seem like a reasonable arrangement even for the
average voter. Though political accountability problems remain, they are
no more serious or pervasive than those afflicting unfunded regulations af-
fecting individuals and firms, and perhaps even those afflicting funded
mandates.
The second point addresses the role the absence of funding plays in
minimizing, though not eliminating, agency costs. It is inescapable that if
one government sets standards for another to implement, then either fund-
ing will be separated from implementation, as it is with funded mandates, or
rulemaking will be separated from apparent political accountability, as crit-
ics describe unfunded mandates. Either form of separation has its costs. I
have suggested that the costs associated with the second kind of separation,
as generated by unfunded mandates, need some reassessment. In most set-
tings these costs are unlikely to be much different from those engendered
by unfunded regulation more generally. The special criticism saved for un-
funded intergovernmental mandates is thus somewhat puzzling and perhaps
misplaced.
127 There is an extensive literature on the desirability (or not) of allowing a deduction for state and
local tax expenditures. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for
Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L. & ECON. 193, 200-01 (1973); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413 (1996); Ed-
ward A. Zelinsky, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: Income Measurement, Tax Expenditures
and Partial, Functional Deductibility, 6 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 9 (1987). This literature generally does not
focus on the above-the-line versus below-the-line issue. See Kaplow, supra, at 415 n.4 (question of
itemization "an administrative concern that will not be considered here").
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The third and perhaps most novel point advanced here is the sense that
the real concern with unfunded intergovernmental mandates may be dis-
tributional. Part of this concern stems from understanding the role that the
tax system plays in spreading the costs of other forms of unfunded regula-
tion. The routine deductibility of some compliance costs produces a shar-
ing of costs between the apparent, and less than apparent victims of
regulation and the larger, tax-paying public. This sharing ameliorates fair-
ness concerns about some of these regulations, though it also has the poten-
tial to threaten the optimistic view that interest groups that would be heavily
burdened by proposed regulations successfully invest in order to defeat
such rulemaking. By contrast, to the extent that subordinate governments'
compliance costs are not shared through the tax system, unfunded mandates
resemble uncompensated regulations directed at individuals. It is perhaps
unsurprising to note that when individuals, rather than subordinate govern-
ments, are concerned, common intuitions have long supported anxieties
about the fairness of these regulations. The contemporary fuss over un-
funded mandates offers us the opportunity to think further about the more
complex distributional impact of regulations aimed at state and local gov-
ernments.
POSTSCRIPT
When presenting this Article, I have frequently been asked whether I
believe that Congress would pass the same intergovernmental mandates if it
were forced to pay for them. I do not. But I would not ascribe all such
changes in outcome to the salutary effects of the self-discipline of the
budget process any more than I believe that such changes in outcome would
necessarily benefit the American polity. Rather, I would ascribe many
changes to legitimate concerns about the dangers of providing state and lo-
cal governments with open-ended federal funding-the agency cost prob-
lem. Intergovernmental mandates, like uncompensated regulation generally,
make it possible to achieve certain types of public goals at reasonable social
cost. These problems may be left unaddressed if the only alternative is
public overfunding. Underregulation-whether of private entities, indi-
viduals, or subordinate governments---can be as big a social problem as
overregulation.
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